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I. INTRODUCTION 
Can the United States government enforce a warrant to compel an 
American Internet service provider (“provider” or “ISP”) to surrender 
a customer’s data that are stored in another country? Should it be able 
to do so? This Note focuses on a case that was before the Supreme 
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Court that addressed this question.1 United States v. Microsoft, 
(“Microsoft”) would have interpreted the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA” or “the Act”)2 pertaining to when and how the government 
may compel a provider of electronic communication service to disclose 
customer or subscriber content information.3 However, before the 
Court made a ruling, Congress passed the Clarifying Lawful Overseas 
Use of Data Act (“CLOUD Act”) as part of an omnibus bill, which 
gave a legislative solution to this issue.4 Before the CLOUD Act was 
passed, courts struggled to understand and apply the SCA in a 
technologically evolving world, where characterizing the “cloud” itself 
was cloudy. 
The framework in which courts addressed this issue was through 
a territoriality lens.5 This means that courts interpreted the application 
of the SCA dependent upon notions of where data are stored and 
whether US law enforcement may lawfully gain access to the data they 
have a warrant for if such data are stored abroad. In short, courts framed 
the issue as whether a provider must comply with an SCA warrant if 
the sought-for data are stored on a server located domestically or 
abroad. However, both possible answers to that issue have problematic 
implications, so neither would be fully satisfactory. Congressional 
action with regard to this issue was long overdue. Building off of the 
CLOUD Act, this Note proposes a version of that bill that considers the 
competing interests of law enforcement, users, other countries, and 
technology companies, rather than only physical location. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief background of Fourth 
Amendment protections and the SCA. Part II outlines and discusses the 
appellate history of the Microsoft case. Part III analyzes the problems 
of both possible outcomes of the Microsoft issue as it was framed. 
Finally, Part IV discusses the most recent legislative solution to the 
 
1. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (1986). 
3. Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. at 1186. For convenience, I will refer to all internet, electronic, 
and cloud service providers, and other applicable providers as a “provider.” 
4. The Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act was incorporated into the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141 div. V, 132 Stat. 348, 1212–25 
[hereinafter CLOUD Act]. 
5. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Microsoft I]; Matter 
of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 
829 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Microsoft II]. 
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SCA and proposes an optimal result to address cyberspace cases 
dealing with similar predicaments in the future. 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT CONCERNS AND THE STORED 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
Standards of privacy in the United States stem from the 
Constitution. In particular, the Fourth Amendment protects “against 
unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government.6 An 
established principle in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is the 
distinction between government surveillance inside versus outside of 
one’s home.7 This distinction is based on the idea that a person does 
not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in public spaces, as 
opposed to the home.8 In public, police are not required to have any 
“cause or order to conduct surveillance outside.”9 In private places, 
however, police must have a warrant issued “upon probable cause . . . 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”10 
The inside/outside distinction helps to “ensure[] a basic balance 
of Fourth Amendment protection[s]” between a person’s privacy and 
the ability of police to conduct investigations efficiently.11 However, 
this distinction becomes blurred in the context of online activity that is 
neither clearly outside nor inside. On the one hand, online activity 
requires the services of a third-party intermediary, the provider.12 
Therefore, an Internet user does not have a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” because the Internet is a public domain not singularly 
 
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
7. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1010 (2010). 
8. See id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
9. Id. 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
11. Kerr, supra note 7, at 1011. 
12. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1209–10 (2004); United States v. Warshak, 
631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“An ISP is the intermediary that makes email communication 
possible. Emails must pass through an ISP’s servers to reach their intended recipient.”). For a 
general definition of Internet Service Provider, see Margaret Rouse, ISP (Internet service 
provider), TECHTARGET (Feb. 2006), https://searchwindevelopment.techtarget.com/definition/
ISP [https://perma.cc/GER4-AVY2] (defining an ISP as “a company that provides . . . access to 
the Internet”). 
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controlled by the user.13 On the other hand, users do have a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” online, because they have access to certain 
spaces on the Internet that are not accessible to the public, such as 
private emails, social media messaging, or other websites where a 
single user login is required to access an account or other information.14 
Viewing Internet use in physical terms also blurs the 
inside/outside distinction. The Internet is fully contained within wires 
and storage devices that a police officer could not see by chance when 
in a public space.15 In that sense, the Internet is inside. Users can opt 
for such wired connections or wireless connections.16 If users have a 
wireless connection, the Internet is outside in the sense that 
communications are transmitted over airwaves. Airwaves can be 
“intercepted in the open” because they do not pass through private 
channels.17 Thus, the traditional inside/outside distinction viewed 
purely in regards to physicality may be arbitrary depending on the type 
of technology a user has installed in his or her home.18 The result is that 
the inside/outside distinction ceases to “capture the basic balance of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”19 Traditional interpretations of the 
Fourth Amendment were premised on the importance of physicality 
and location.20 Although cyberspace has often been compared to the 
physical realm, the reality is that the traditional physical assumptions 
ingrained in the Fourth Amendment are not quite the same on the 
Internet.21 There are virtually no limits on the amount of data that can 
 
13. See Kerr, supra note 12, at 1210. 
14. Id. at 1210–11; Zoe Argento, Whose Social Network Account: A Trade Secret Approach 
to Allocating Rights, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 201, 237 (2013). 
15. Id. at 1012. 
16. Kerr, supra note 7, at 1012.  
17. Id. 
18. See id.  
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 1013. See also Alexander Dugas Battey, Jr., Note, A Step in the Wrong Direction: 
The Case for Restraining the Extraterritorial Application of the Stored Communications Act, 42 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 262, 267 (2016) (“[T]he possibility of electronically stored 
information was unforeseeable and the Fourth Amendment’s protections traditionally extended 
only to the tangible realm. Thus, Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act in 1986 to 
fill that gap to apply to our ‘virtual homes.’”). 
21. See Voyeur Dorm, L.C. v. City of Tampa, 265 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding city 
code law prohibiting adult entertainment offered to the public did not apply to company that 
recorded adult entertainment at a premises because the entertainment was offered only to online 
subscribers and not physically to the public); Kyllo v. United States, 121 U.S. 2038, 2043 (2001) 
(“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the home’s interior that 
2018] EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF US ACCESS TO DATA 187 
be stored and accessed on a device,22 and data can be automatically 
stored in any number of locations across the globe.23 To further 
distance the physical world from cyberspace, users on a computer 
network do not necessarily have any privacy because third parties, the 
providers, own and operate the networks we all access and use.24 
In light of developing technology and fear of government 
intrusions, Congress passed the Stored Communications Act in 1986.25 
Congress was concerned because there were no “Federal statutory 
standards to protect the privacy and security of [certain electronic] 
communications.”26 The SCA governs stored data communications and 
offers network account holders “Fourth Amendment–like privacy 
protections.”27 The meat of the SCA is contained in two sections, one 
 
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not 
in general public use”) (citation omitted); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding 
that officers may examine physical aspects of a cell phone but generally may not search data on 
a cell phone without a warrant). 
22. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (“[T]he possible intrusion on privacy is not physically 
limited in the same way when it comes to cell phones,” because they are essentially 
“minicomputers” with an “immense storage capacity” that are materially distinguishable from 
“physical realities.”); Kerr, supra note 7, at 1013 (“Traditional Fourth Amendment rules have 
been crafted in light of those assumptions [physicality limits on scale and location]; the rules 
generally are scale- and location-specific. Those assumptions do not hold in the Internet 
environment. In a world of data, third-party services can always provide more data, and the data 
can be anywhere. No limit exists on the number, size, or location of accounts, services, or data 
one person can control that might contain the evidence that the government seeks.”). 
23. See Kerr, supra note 7, at 1013; see also Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp, 829 F.3d 197, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2016). 
24. See Kerr, supra note 12, at 1209-10 (“When we use a computer network such as the 
Internet, however, a user does not have a physical ‘home,’ nor really any private space at all. 
Instead, a user typically has a network account consisting of a block of computer storage that is 
owned by a network service provider . . . Although a user may think of that storage space as a 
‘virtual home,’ in fact that ‘home’ is really just a block of ones and zeroes stored somewhere on 
somebody else’s computer. This means that when we use the Internet, we communicate with 
and through that remote computer to contact other computers. Our most private information ends 
up being sent to private third parties and held far away on remote network servers.”). 
25. Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012)); see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1-2 (1986) (“When the Framers 
of the Constitution acted to guard against the arbitrary use of Government power to maintain 
surveillance over citizens, there were limited methods of intrusion into the ‘houses, papers, and 
effects’ protected by the fourth amendment. During the intervening 200 years, development of 
new methods of communication and devices for surveillance has expanded dramatically the 
opportunity for such intrusions.”); Kerr, supra note 12, at 1208; Jennifer Daskal, The Un-
Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 360-61 (2015). 
26. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986). 
27. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1212. 
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limiting a provider’s voluntary disclosures and the other setting forth 
when the government can compel involuntary disclosures from 
providers.28 Specifically, section 2702 “generally prohibits the 
provider of a wire or electronic communication service to the public 
from knowingly divulging the contents of any communications while 
in electronic storage by that service to any person other than the 
addressee or intended recipient” with certain enumerated exceptions.29 
Section 2703 provides requirements for when the government may gain 
access to contents of a stored electronic communication.30 
Whereas the “Fourth Amendment imposes restrictions on the 
government’s authority to search and seize . . . , [SCA] warrants 
provide the government the affirmative authorization to do so.”31 Thus, 
the SCA balances individual privacy interests with the government’s 
interest in conducting investigations. Privacy protection is exemplified 
by the SCA’s ability to limit providers from voluntarily disclosing 
information about their customer communications or records.32 It also 
limits the “government’s ability to compel providers to disclose 
information in their possession about their customers and 
subscribers.”33 
The SCA also differentiates between content and noncontent 
information.34 Noncontent information, referred to as “a record or other 
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of” a provider, is 
also known as “metadata” or “traffic data.”35 Such noncontent 
information is not the substance of the communication, but rather refers 
to information about the message or transmission, such as names, 
addresses, and length of service or transmission.36 The SCA defines 
“‘contents,’ when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, [as] includ[ing] any information concerning the 
 
28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702-2703. 
29. Id. § 2702; S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 37 (1986). 
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703; see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 38 (1986). 
31. Daskal, supra note 25, at 333. 
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2702; Kerr, supra note 12, at 1213. 
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2703; Kerr, supra note 12, at 1212. 
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(c) 
35. Id. § 2703(c)(1); Kerr, supra note 12, at 1227. 
36. Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The Evolving 
Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 473, 485 (2016); 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(c)(2). 
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substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.”37 Content 
information, which has a higher standard of privacy protection, would 
include such information as the subject line and body of an email or the 
spoken message in a recording.38 Orin Kerr, a renowned scholar in the 
field of cyberspace law, defined content information as “the 
communication that a person wishes to share or communicate with 
another person.”39 To analogize this in the physical world, the inside of 
a sealed letter would be the content information—namely the substance 
of the letter.40 Similarly, any information written outside the envelope, 
such as names and addresses, or information surrounding the 
envelope’s delivery would be noncontent information.41 Congress 
afforded content information a higher degree of privacy “for reasons 
that most people find intuitive: actual contents of messages naturally 
implicate greater privacy concerns than information (much of it 
network-generated) about those communications.”42 
The SCA contains three means for a government to compel 
information—a subpoena, a court order, and a warrant—all of which 
have different requirements and outcomes.43 SCA warrants require the 
highest standard of all such means to obtain disclosure under the 
SCA—compliance with the procedures within the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.44 This high standard is required because a warrant 
compels the service provider to disclose everything stored in a user’s 
account.45 The general requirements for obtaining a warrant under the 
 
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (stating “the terms defined in section 2510 of this title have, 
respectively, the definitions given such terms in that section”); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). 
38. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1228; OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. 
ATTORNEYS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 
IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, 122–23 (2009).  
39.  Kerr, supra note 12, at 1228. 
40. But see Russell Hsiao, Implications for the Future of Global Data Security and 
Privacy: The Territorial Application of the Stored Communications Act and the Microsoft Case, 
24 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 215, 242 (2015) (concluding emails “are fundamentally different from 
letters” because packet switching technology, which is disassembling an email and reassembling 
it upon receipt, “would be roughly analogous to unsealing the letter, and sending the letter and 
envelope separately, and hav[ing] it reassembled when it reaches its recipient”). 
41. See Kerr, supra note 7, at 1019. 
42. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1228. For Kerr’s in-depth analysis of why noncontent 
information does not require higher privacy protections equivalent to content information, see 
id. at 1228 n.142. 
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2703; Daskal, supra note 25, at 361. 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(c). 
45. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1223. 
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require “probable cause” and an 
issuance of the warrant by a magistrate judge for a government search 
and seizure.46 This “probable cause” standard positions the U.S. as 
having one of the “more robust” standards of proof compared to other 
nations.47 With these considerations in mind, this Note focuses solely 
on SCA warrants because of their high standard and wide scope of 
disclosure. SCA warrants would presumably set the standard for other 
extraterritorial applications of the SCA. 
III. CURRENT APPLICATIONS OF THE SCA REGARDING 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Microsoft was a case of first instance in the Supreme Court on the 
issue of whether the US government could use an SCA warrant to 
compel a provider to disclose data that are stored abroad.48 The district 
court in Microsoft was the first case to hear this specific issue.49 
Following both Microsoft’s district court and appellate court decisions 
on this issue, other courts have consistently ruled in favor of the 
government and enforced SCA warrants for data stored abroad.50 
The case involves Microsoft Corporation, a provider that owns 
and operates a web-based email service where account holders can 
 
46. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1) 
47. See Daskal, supra note 36, at 482-83 (comparing warrant requirements of the U.S. and 
other countries and concluding “[t]he U.S. warrant requirement is unique . . . and more robust 
than what is required in most other nations”). 
48. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1186 (2018) 
49.  In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
50. Only a handful of courts have considered the issue and discussed the appellate court’s 
holding in Microsoft. These courts have criticized the holding and have declined to follow it, 
instead consistently ruling in favor of the government. See e.g., In re Search Warrant No. 16-
960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (holding SCA warrants did not violate 
the presumption against extraterritoriality and were enforceable abroad); In re Search Warrant 
to Google, Inc., Mag. No. 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391 (D.N.J. July 10, 2017); In re Info. 
Associated with One Yahoo Email Address that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Yahoo, 
Case Nos. 17-M-1234 & 17-M-1235, 2017 WL 706307 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2017); In re Info. 
Associated with [Redacted]@gmail.com, Case No. 16-mj-757 (GMH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
92601 (D.D.C. June 2, 2017); In re Search of Info. Associated with Accounts Identified as 
[redacted]@gmail.com, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2017); In the Matter of Search of 
Content that Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Case No. 16-mc-80263-LB, 2017 WL 
1487625 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2017); In re Two Email Accounts at Google, Inc., Case No. 17-M-
1235, 2017 WL 2838156 (E.D. Wis. June 30, 2017); In re Search Warrant Issued to Google, 
Inc., 264 F. Supp. 3d 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2017); In the Matter of the Search of: Contents & Records 
Relating to the Google Accounts, 18-mc-00020, 2018 WL 942301 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2018). 
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send, receive, and store email messages.51 Microsoft stores these email 
messages in datacenters, which have various locations both within the 
United States and abroad.52 In order to increase network speed for users 
and reduce “network latency,” or slow Internet speeds, Microsoft’s 
system makes efforts to assign each account to the closest datacenter to 
the user as possible.53 Originally, Microsoft managed where account 
information was stored according to the country code with which a user 
registered his or her account.54 This was an automatic process.55 Once 
an account was migrated, or moved, abroad, “all content and most 
noncontent information associated with the account [was] deleted from 
servers in the United States.”56 However, following the Second 
Circuit’s decision, Microsoft changed its policy so that it “now 
automatically detects customers’ actual location and stores their emails 
in datacenters nearby.”57 
In 2013, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York (“the district court”) upheld an SCA warrant 
“authoriz[ing] the search and seizure of information associated with a 
specified web-based e-mail account that is ‘stored at premises owned, 
maintained, controlled, or operated by Microsoft.’”58 The warrant 
compelled Microsoft to disclose both content and noncontent 
information about the account.59 Microsoft determined that the warrant 
targeted an account that was hosted in its Dublin, Ireland server, with 
some noncontent information stored in US servers.60 Microsoft 
complied with the warrant insofar as producing the noncontent 
information that was stored domestically, but refused to turn over the 
content information stored in Ireland.61 This refusal was accompanied 
 
51. Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2016). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 203. 
55. Id. 
56. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (emphasis added). 
57. Brief for Respondent at 57, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) 
(No. 17-2) (citing Delivering a faster and more responsive Outlook.com, MICROSOFT (Oct. 27, 
2017), https://blogs.office.com/en-us/2017/10/27/delivering-a-faster-and-more-responsive-
outlook-com/ [https://perma.cc/MZ8Y-JT7P]). 
58. Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d, at 467-68. 
59. See id. at 468. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
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by a motion to quash the warrant to the extent that it directed Microsoft 
to produce information stored abroad.62 
The procedural history of this case exemplifies the different 
stances that courts have taken when faced with extraterritoriality issues 
involving SCA warrants. Extraterritoriality with regard to the reach of 
the SCA is problematic because the United States has recognized a 
presumption against extraterritoriality.63 This presumption means that 
“when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none, and reflect[s] the presumption that United 
States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.”64 
The district court held that the SCA warrant was valid and did not 
violate the presumption against extraterritoriality.65 The court reasoned 
that the “concerns that animate the presumption against 
extraterritoriality are simply not present here” because “an SCA 
warrant does not criminalize conduct taking place in a foreign country; 
it does not involve the deployment of American law enforcement 
personnel abroad; it does not require even the physical presence of 
service provider employees at the location where data are stored.”66 
The court found the language of section 2703(a) ambiguous in its 
reference to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and, therefore, 
found guidance in the legislative history and congressional intent.67 
The court ultimately found that an SCA warrant is a “hybrid” of “part 
search warrant and part subpoena” because, although the process to 
obtain it is “like a search warrant,” an SCA warrant “is executed like a 
subpoena in that it is served on the [provider] in possession of the 
information and does not involve government agents entering the 
premises of the [provider] to” conduct its search and seizure.68 
Additionally, the court stated other practical reasons to support its 
conclusion, such as the substantial burden on the government to 
conduct investigations due to the lack of a requirement for the provider 
to verify information as well as the inconvenience and inefficiency of 
 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 475. 
64. Id. (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) and 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)). 
65. Id. at 477. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 470-71. 
68. Id. at 471. 
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pursing an alternative diplomatic means called Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties (“MLAT ”).69 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed the district court, holding that the SCA warrant did violate the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, so Microsoft would not have to 
turn over its customer’s content stored abroad.70 The Second Circuit 
reasoned that if “Congress intends a law to apply extraterritorially, it 
gives an ‘affirmative indication’ of that intent,” whereas Congress gave 
no such express indication in the SCA.71 Indeed, the Second Circuit 
emphasized that it is a presumption against extraterritoriality, and 
whether or not Congress intended to limit the statute to only domestic 
application is irrelevant without some explicit agreement to its 
application abroad.72 The court found further guidance in the statute’s 
language and its use of the term of art “warrant,” which “is traditionally 
moored to privacy concepts applied within the territory of the United 
States.”73 The use of the term “warrant” was significant and purposeful, 
as was the use of other terms in the SCA, such as “subpoena.”74 There 
is no subpoena-warrant hybrid as the lower court found, but rather an 
intentional use of each word.75 Finally, the court also noted the 
legislative history and its focus on privacy protection as well as its 
silence as to the citizenship and location of a person.76 In a practical 
sense, Microsoft would have to interact with the Dublin datacenter and 
this could threaten values of state sovereignty and autonomy, which are 
already provided for through an albeit slow, but recognized MLAT 
process.77 
In 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the 
Microsoft case.78 However, the case became moot in April 2018 
because Congress enacted, and the President signed into law, the 
 
69. Id. at 474. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
70. Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016). 
71. Id. at 211 (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010)). 
72. See id. 
73. Id. at 212. 
74. See id. at 212–14. 
75. Id. at 214. 
76. Id. at 219–20. 
77. Id. at 220–21. 
78. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (order granting 
certiorari). 
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CLOUD Act, which amended the SCA to address the extraterritoriality 
issue.79 
IV. PROBLEMATIC EFFECTS OF AN EXTRATERRITORIAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Before addressing the amending CLOUD Act, it is important to 
first understand the SCA itself and what effects could result from 
applying it in favor of enforcing or not enforcing the SCA warrant 
extraterritorially. Microsoft is just one example of how difficult it is to 
apply the SCA to modern, global providers. Ultimately, neither 
outcome of the lower Microsoft decisions is particularly satisfactory 
because of the blanket applications and resulting shortcomings of each 
approach. Microsoft itself even acknowledges that “either 
interpretation will inevitably yield some gap in coverage in the digital 
era.”80 
A. Consequences if the government may obtain data stored abroad 
via the SCA 
One outcome of an extraterritorial framework provides that the 
government may compel US providers to disclose electronic 
communications within the providers’ control that are stored abroad. 
Such a scenario would result in three main problems. First, complying 
with an SCA warrant may lead to a violation of a foreign country’s law. 
Second, there would be heightened fears of US privacy intrusion 
abroad resulting in economic burdens for providers. Finally, foreign 
countries may enact data localization measures, which would shift 
business from the U.S. to foreign data storage companies. 
One of the largest concerns about allowing the government access 
to data stored abroad via an SCA warrant is the international effect. 
Different providers utilize different technology when it comes to 
storing their users’ data. For example, 
Google user data—such as an email, or an e-mail attachment—is 
not stored as one single, cohesive digital file; instead, Google 
stores individual data files in multiple data “shards,” each separate 
shard being stored in separate locations around the world. And, 
 
79. Id. at 1187-88. 
80. Brief for Respondent at 32, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2) (advocating 
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currently written). 
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Google cannot even determine where its separate data shards are 
stored around the world at any given time; and, even if one shard 
were to stay in one place, without all of the shards being collected 
and put together at once to form the actual digital file, each shard 
alone is a useless piece of coded gibberish. Of course, each shard 
might move instantaneously to somewhere else; and then to 
somewhere else; and so on, and so forth.81 
Therefore, certain technology may make “it uncertain which 
foreign country’s sovereignty would be implicated.”82 Even if a 
specific country is implicated, as Ireland is in the Microsoft case83, 
there are potential conflict of laws issues that arise. Microsoft “presents 
a potential conflict of law between the United States and the European 
Union.”84 Refusing to comply with an SCA warrant “could lead to a 
contempt of court charge” in the United States.85 Meanwhile, 
unilaterally seizing data of an EU citizen without first obtaining 
consent of Ireland, or the country involved, would violate EU data 
protection laws.86 
Jennifer Daskal, a scholar who specializes in cyberspace law, 
noted that a complicating fact is that the SCA itself is a blocking 
statute,87 which “prohibit[s] providers that do business in their 
jurisdiction from responding to foreign-based requests for such data, 
and instead require[s] the exercise of formal government-to-
government requests for data.”88 The SCA consequently prohibits US-
based providers from responding to properly executed foreign 
government requests for the content of stored communications even if 
 
81. In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 724 (E.D. Pa. 
2017). 
82. Id. at 723. 
83. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
84. Battey, supra note 20, at 282. But see Reply Brief for the United States at 20–22, 
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85. Battey, supra note 20, at 282. 
86. Id. at 286 (concluding an SCA warrant would violate the E.U. Data Protection 
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87. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)-(b) (2018) prohibits the voluntary disclosure of electronic 
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88. Daskal, supra note 36, at 490. 
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a foreign government “is seeking the data of one of its own citizens in 
connection with the investigation of a local crime.”89 Daskal also noted 
that a government win “would set a dangerous precedent, allowing 
governments to reach data across borders without regard to the 
sovereign interests of other states . . . [consequently] threaten[ing] 
privacy on a global scale.”90 Therefore, even if no current laws would 
be violated, a government win could be a model for other countries to 
enact similar laws.91 If that were the case, a US-based provider would 
be prohibited from disclosing information under the SCA’s current 
blocking provisions, while simultaneously violating a foreign country’s 
laws modeled after the SCA.92 Such a seizure disregards efforts for 
international police cooperation and, instead, positions US control and 
regulation of data stored abroad above another country’s interest in 
maintaining control over such data within its own borders.93 
The United States argued that enforcement of the SCA warrant in 
the Microsoft case would still respect its international obligations, 
citing the Budapest Convention and arguments specifically directed at 
Ireland.94 The validity and gravity of these international concerns is not 
yet clear. However, the probability of a negative international reaction 
appears imminent, at least to some degree. 
A second problem is, following Edward Snowden’s 
whistleblowing of widespread government surveillance, there will be 
heightened fears of U.S. privacy intrusion if the government can 
enforce SCA warrants for data stored abroad.95 As previously noted, 
allowing such enforcement abroad could “establish a dangerous 
 
89. Id. at 491. 
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93. See Daskal, supra note 25, at 379. 
94. See Brief for Petitioner at 46–52, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 
(2017) (No. 17-2). 
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2018] EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF US ACCESS TO DATA 197 
precedent under which nations can unilaterally––without agreed-upon 
substantive or procedural standards––compel the production of data 
located anywhere in the world simply by asserting jurisdiction over the 
company controlling the data.”96 This precedent also would “arguably 
justif[y] any country in the world with jurisdiction over any provider 
(including US-based providers) from compelling, according to their 
own standards, access to sought-after data.”97 However, Microsoft 
pointed out an ironic result from a government win. Since the 
government’s theory in Microsoft is that the focus of the SCA is 
disclosure, as opposed to storage, “[i]t would leave U.S. citizens’ U.S.-
stored communications unprotected, so long as they were disclosed 
overseas.”98 It could also “facilitate corporate espionage” by allowing 
foreign countries “to obtain proprietary business information stored” 
abroad.99 
Ultimately, the United States would be announcing that its law 
enforcement power reaches across the globe so that it can access data 
stored abroad so long as it is held by a US-based provider.100 The 
effects of this law enforcement power would lead to “heighten[ed] fears 
of U.S. privacy intrusion both at home and [abroad].”101 Such fears 
would burden American providers “to interpret unclear and dated 
congressional legislation and attempt to construct a coherent and 
precise compliance policy for their business to assure certain privacy 
protections to their customers without violating domestic or 
international law.”102 Consequently, American providers would suffer 
from lost revenue due to fears of privacy intrusion.103 
 
96. Daskal, supra note 25, at 397. 
97. Daskal, supra note 36, at 490. 
98. Brief for Respondent at 12, 21, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2) (emphasis 
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In fact, providers have already begun to feel the negative 
economic effects. For example, in the wake of Snowden’s 
whistleblowing, the German government ended its contract with 
Verizon, and the Brazilian government announced it would not renew 
its license agreement with Microsoft.104 Also, original reports 
estimated that cloud computing providers could lose anywhere from 
US$22 billion105 to as much as US$180 billion in revenue in the years 
following the Snowden revelations.106 However, a more recent 
Forrester survey revealed that losses may only amount to US$47 billion 
for the period from 2014 to 2016, which was lower than initially 
predicted, but still significant.107 Microsoft contended that the 
multibillion-dollar US cloud computing industry is built on the trust of 
its customers, and a government win would eliminate that trust, 
seriously damaging those providers.108 
Foreign governments may also react to a government win in the 
Microsoft case by enacting data localization laws that would likely be 
directed towards those nations’ own citizens.109 Such laws would 
require nationals to “store [their] data with locally-based providers so 
as to ensure that the data [are] subject [only] to that nation’s 
jurisdiction.”110 Data localization efforts operate when an individual or 
government removes their business from US providers to local ISPs 
because that may be the only safeguard against actual or perceived US 
intrusion into data stored abroad, even if the account holder of such 
data is a non-US citizen living abroad.111 Russia, for example, already 
enacted a data localization measure in 2015, which “requir[es] Internet 
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companies to locate their computer servers that contain personal 
information on Russian citizens within [Russia’s] borders.”112 
Additionally, “allowing governments to reach data across borders 
without regard to the sovereign interests of other states” would 
“threaten privacy on a global scale.”113 Other governments may follow 
the United States’ example and “[assert] the same authority,” 
conceivably even as retribution.114 
Whether or not law enforcement’s access to data stored abroad 
would be an intrusion, such data localization laws would, nevertheless, 
act as a nation’s assertion of sovereignty.115 A government win could 
lay the foundation for these laws simply due to tension.116 This fear 
may or may not be justified. Still, fear will simply lead to global 
isolation, at least with regard to Internet services, handicapping 
providers from growing and users from getting competitive online 
services.117 Although a government win would seem to aid in law 
enforcement efforts to conduct investigations that transcend U.S. 
borders, an ironic consequence may actually ensue.118 If data 
localization movements succeed, law enforcement’s access to 
extraterritorial data will actually be compromised if data ends up in the 
hands of foreign providers.119 Data localization laws may also, 
however, develop as a response to a Microsoft win, as will be discussed 
in the following section.120 
The foregoing concerns highlight the potentially unappealing 
outcomes of interpreting SCA warrants as allowing the government to 
obtain content data that are stored outside US borders. These concerns 
are neither completely comprehensive nor actually imminent, as there 
may be other consequences not yet taken into account or they may be 
mitigated or simply not materialize as predicted. Nevertheless, they 
would have appeared to present a strong possibility of occurring. 
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B. Consequences if the government may not compel ISPs to disclose 
data stored abroad 
The other outcome of an extraterritorial framework provides that 
the government may not compel US service providers to disclose 
electronic communications within the providers’ control that are stored 
outside the borders of the United States. This circumstance would 
produce its own set of problems. First, whether an SCA warrant may 
compel stored data abroad could be somewhat arbitrary, depending on 
a provider’s business decision about where to store data. Second, it 
would burden law enforcement. And lastly, it may also fuel a kind of 
data localization movement. 
One of the more disturbing effects of a Microsoft win would result 
in a troubling dependence upon happenstance. As Daskal aptly puts it, 
unlike tangible property, 
we delegate large quantities of our digital property to the control 
of others. Vast quantities of electronic data are now held, or 
otherwise controlled, by third parties, including ISPs, cloud 
service providers, and companies that maintain and operate the 
fiber-optic cables that make up the Internet’s backbone. Moreover, 
it is the third party, not the user, that generally makes the critical 
decisions about the path by which data travels or where it is stored. 
It is also the third party, not the user, that is often called on by 
government officials to collect and produce the sought-after 
data.121 
Users generally cannot dictate where or how their data are stored 
or moved.122 Rather, the third-party provider controls the data to 
execute its own business decisions.123 Such decisions may promote, for 
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instance, obtaining efficient Internet speeds and reducing network 
latency,124 or they may aim for “the most cost-effective” solution.125 
Reliance on the location of data gives a provider immense power 
by allowing it to circumvent law enforcement’s access to certain 
data.126 By migrating subscriber data to datacenters it builds abroad, 
the provider could protect its subscribers from the reach of US law 
enforcement.127 Another arbitrary means of circumvention occurs 
when a provider “move[s] data all over the world, sometimes breaking 
it into ‘shards’ so that different portions of a single email account may 
be stored in multiple countries at any one moment.”128 Google engages 
in such a technique, whereby it “automatically moves data from one 
location on Google’s network to another as frequently as needed to 
optimize for performance, reliability, and other efficiencies.”129 
Google’s sharding method also makes it “possible that the network will 
change the location of data between the time when the legal process is 
sought and when it is served.”130 Indeed, “Google’s compliance with a 
Section 2703 warrant would depend on the happenstance of where the 
data [are] located at the precise moment when the warrant is served or 
the provider accesses its network”131 It therefore becomes extremely 
difficult to apply Microsoft’s data location theory to other ISPs that 
have different methods for storing data. On the other hand, the Supreme 
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Court could have ruled on the specific facts of the Microsoft case and 
leave the issue open with regard to providers utilizing other data storage 
technologies, such as Google’s. 
Even Microsoft’s former means of data storage were somewhat 
arbitrary because Microsoft’s system used an automated process that 
depended upon information a subscriber provided, such as his or her 
“country code.”132 Besides Google and Microsoft, “some providers 
may not even be able to determine whether they currently store the 
requested data in the United States or abroad.”133 Although large 
providers may use automated processes, they still retain control and 
“may also have business incentives––based on customer demand––to 
move data to locations where cooperation with U.S. law enforcement 
is minimal, thus creating significant barriers for law enforcement 
agents investigating crimes.”134 
The next main problem pertains to burdening law enforcement. A 
Microsoft win would result in difficulty in conducting criminal 
investigations if law enforcement cannot obtain data that are stored 
abroad but maintained by a domestic provider.135 Simply put, law 
enforcement would have to conduct investigations with less 
information. In our modernized world in which data contain a 
substantial amount of information, including evidence pertinent to 
criminal investigations, Microsoft’s data location theory would create 
an “insurmountable barrier” to enforcing the law.136 As a result, law 
 
132. Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp, 829 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2016). Unless manipulation occurs, this is no longer 
applicable to Microsoft’s situation following its recent change in its data storage policy. See 
Brief for Respondent at 57, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2) (citing Delivering a 
faster and more responsive Outlook.com, MICROSOFT (Oct. 27, 2017), https://blogs.office.com/
en-us/2017/10/27/delivering-a-faster-and-more-responsive-outlook-com/ 
[https://perma.cc/MZ8Y-JT7P]). 
133. Brief for Petitioner at 44, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2). 
134. Daskal, supra note 25, at 390. But see Brief for Respondent at 56, Microsoft Corp., 
138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2) (contending that Microsoft’s decisions about where to store data was 
not based on evading or hampering law enforcement, but rather were based on reducing network 
latency). 
135. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Brief for Petitioner at 41–45, 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2017) (No. 17-2). 
136. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2). 
2018] EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF US ACCESS TO DATA 203 
enforcement would need to use diplomatic means to conduct 
investigations via the use of MLATs.137 
An MLAT is an international agreement that allows for 
cooperation in criminal investigations and other related matters.138 The 
MLAT process is extremely slow and complicated, and it begins with 
a formal request from law enforcement officials to another country for 
assistance and cooperation from that country with domestic law 
enforcement.139 
The main problems surrounding MLATs stem from their 
procedures.140 They are very slow and not universal, and MLAT 
requests can also be denied.141 Typically, the entire MLAT process is 
estimated to last ten months or longer, depending in part on the number 
of requests.142 Since 2000, MLAT requests have “increased nearly 85% 
and the number of requests for computer records has increased over 
1000%.”143 MLATs “require the data to be held in a relatively fixed 
location, and in a location known to the United States.”144 This is 
extremely problematic and futile for data that move rapidly, such as 
that maintained by Google. MLATs are also not universal because the 
U.S. does not have an MLAT with every country in the world.145 In the 
absence of an MLAT or executive agreement, Letters Rogatory could 
be another means to obtain cross-border assistance, but the entire 
process may take a year or more and has similar shortcomings as 
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MLATs.146 A final problem with the MLAT process is that an MLAT 
request may still be denied.147 Therefore, such alternative measures to 
obtain stored data abroad are not currently the most efficient channels 
without some future legislative reform. 
Furthermore, users can easily exacerbate the burden on law 
enforcement by manipulating the system, depending upon which 
provider they use, to ensure their data are stored abroad in order to 
evade law enforcement.148 Users may subscribe to companies that store 
data outside the United States and in countries “unwilling, or perhaps 
technologically unable, to cooperate with official government-to-
government requests for electronic evidence.”149 Another possible 
means of circumvention is for a user to simply input false information 
when signing up for an account or otherwise manipulating one’s IP 
address to trick the provider’s system to attribute the user’s location to 
another country and, consequently, store that user’s data abroad.150 
Moreover, a provider “is under no obligation to verify the information 
provided by a customer at the time an e-mail account is opened.”151 
Microsoft subscribers, for example, were able to exploit the system 
using such methods, at least before its recent policy change.152 
Ultimately, local and national security would also suffer if 
providers reduce cooperation with law enforcement in order to promote 
their own subscribers’ interests and maintain a profitable business.153 
Barriers to law enforcement investigations “impinge[] on the ability to 
fight and solve crime,” and this is likely to increase “as more and more 
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evidence becomes digitalized, even in run-of-the-mill local crimes.”154 
On a national level, national security combating terrorism would also 
be at risk, especially considering the global nature of modern 
terrorism.155 In fact, following the Second Circuit’s decision, law 
enforcement divisions have already experienced some difficulties in 
investigations.156 
A final overarching issue with a Microsoft win would be that it 
may also fuel data localization movements. A Microsoft win with such 
an outcome would seem almost irreconcilable with a government win: 
How could both possible outcomes of the Microsoft decision lead to 
the same problem? There are nuances to both data localization 
movements that slightly differentiate them, that help address this 
conundrum. Unlike data localization movements previously 
described,157 movements responding to a Microsoft win would target 
providers, rather than nationals, and regulate server location, rather 
than provider location.158 If the physical location of a server determines 
law enforcement’s access to stored data, nations mandating data 
localization laws would “require data collecting Internet companies to 
store the collected data on servers physically located within [their own] 
country.”159 
Some providers that aim to protect their users and avoid the grasp 
of US law enforcement might even voluntarily migrate their stored data 
to a location abroad––data localization initiated by a provider itself 
rather than a nation’s government.160 Even though there are differences 
between these data localization movements, some of the effects are the 
 
154. Daskal, supra note 36, at 480. 
155. See Brief for Petitioner at 11, 41, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2). 
156. See Benjamin Battles, Business decisions should not control whether law 
enforcement can investigate local crimes, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 6, 2018, 10:25 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/02/symposium-business-decisions-not-control-whether-law-
enforcement-can-investigate-local-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/9Z5C-CLHP] (citing impeded 
investigations involving crimes against minors in Vermont, Utah, and California); Data Stored 
Abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection in the Digital Era: Statement Before 
the Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5-6 (2017) (statement of Richard W. Downing, Acting 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.) [hereinafter Downing Statement] (citing several examples of 
impeded investigations). 
157. See supra Part III.A. 
158. See generally Daskal, supra note 25, at 392 (differentiating data localization 
movements). 
159. Hsiao, supra note 40, at 219. Accord Woods, supra note 139, at 751. 
160. See Daskal, supra note 36, at 488. 
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same, such as efficiency costs affecting network speeds and monetary 
costs on providers that would spread to users.161 Apple, for instance, 
recently announced that it will begin to store iCloud account 
information of its Chinese subscribers in China as part of a joint venture 
with a Chinese partner.162 This is a result of new data localization laws 
requiring “cloud services offered to Chinese citizens [to] be operated 
by Chinese companies and that the data be stored in China.”163 Chinese 
officials will be able to use their own legal system to get access to 
Apple’s Chinese subscriber information instead of going to US courts. 
This raises concerns about potential human rights abuses, such as the 
Chinese government using this more easily accessible information to 
track down dissidents.164 
Localization efforts could also theoretically drive law 
enforcement officers to “resort to other, less wholesome tactics to get 
access” to data stored abroad.165 For example, such tactics may include 
raiding the offices of providers and even surveilling a nation’s own 
citizens.166 Other adverse implications involve “the innovative 
potential of the Internet and . . . privacy rights of both American and 
foreign-based users.”167 Specifically, Americans with data stored 
abroad will be at risk for privacy intrusions if that nation does not have 
as high a standard as probable cause in obtaining a lawful warrant.168 
Small start-ups may also get priced out of the international market if 
foreign nations with localization laws source only from domestic 
ISPs.169 
 
161. See Woods, supra note 139, at 752–53. 
162. Stephen Nellis & Cate Cadell, Apple moves to store iCloud keys in China, raising 
human rights fears, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2018, 12:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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fears-idUSKCN1G8060 [https://perma.cc/67KS-7H3K]. 
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165. Woods, supra note 139, at 751. 
166. Id. at 751, 753. 
167. See Daskal, supra note 36, at 488. 
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V. PROPOSAL 
The previous discussion demonstrates the difficulty posed by 
Microsoft and the state of the law before passage of the CLOUD Act.170 
Fortunately, Congress has recently passed legislation that specifically 
addresses the extraterritoriality problems. Part V discusses the 
challenges to the extraterritorial framework as well as the CLOUD Act 
as a solution. 
A. The Difficulty of Framing Data Territorially 
The debate about whether data has features of territoriality and 
can be subject to rules of territoriality largely depends on how one 
describes data’s characteristics. On the one hand, data are territorial and 
have features of both intangible assets (like intellectual property, 
investments, and debts) and physical assets.171 Accordingly, courts 
“have at least two lines of inquiry for determining when a state ought 
to be able to properly assert jurisdiction over data in the cloud”: it can 
properly apply existing case law dealing with either intangible or 
physical assets to data.172 The other side of the debate is more 
persuasive, finding that data have unique characteristics that “raise 
fundamental challenges to territoriality doctrine.”173 Declaring that 
data can be assigned to a physical location is arbitrary because data 
move frequently, and sometimes in pieces, depending on the providers’ 
algorithms and business decisions, and typically without any consent 
or even awareness on behalf of the user.174 Although it would be 
convenient, the concept of data simply is an exceptional phenomenon 
and should be treated according to its own characteristics––not the 
characteristics of anything else. 
Framing the issue of the government’s ability to access data stored 
abroad in territorial terms brings with it practical difficulties as well as 
negative results, either way. One commentator succinctly pointed out 
some of these issues: 
 
170. See supra Parts III–IV.  
171. See Woods, supra note 139, at 734–35, 756–63 (arguing that data does not have novel 
features, but instead is inherently territorial, and courts may treat it as an intangible asset or as a 
physical object). 
172. Id. at 763. 
173. Daskal, supra note 25, at 378. 
174. See id. at 367, 373. 
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Territorial rules aspire to certainty, but technology makes it harder 
to define “territoriality” in a consistent and predictable way. 
Technology weakens territoriality as a proxy for policy goals 
because data often move in ways that are disconnected with the 
interests of users and lawmakers. Technology makes it easier for 
public and private actors to circumvent territorial rules (often 
without detection), thus interfering with the existing allocation of 
policymaking authority.175 
B. Building on the CLOUD Act 
Microsoft illustrates the difficulties that come with outdated laws 
that vaguely address an issue. In its unamended state, the SCA would 
not give a satisfactory answer to the question of whether providers must 
comply with SCA warrants when law enforcement seeks data stored 
abroad.176 Shortly before the Microsoft I decision came out, Microsoft 
wrote in a blog post that having “[c]learer rules for access to data 
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States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996) (quoting Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States 
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Microsoft. 
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internationally would help open borders and enable companies to host 
services and data in one country for citizens in another.”177 The need 
for a bright-line rule was evident. Microsoft summarily pointed out that 
Congress should legislate and “rewrite the statute to strike a new, 
twenty-first century balance between law-enforcement interests, our 
relations with foreign nations, the privacy of our citizens, and the 
competitiveness of our technology industry,”178 a belief that the 
government also shares, albeit with a much stronger emphasis on law-
enforcement interests.179 
On February 6, 2018, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced a bill to 
directly address the issue, and it is aptly entitled the CLOUD Act.180 
This bipartisan bill is supported both by the US Department of Justice 
and large technology companies, including Microsoft.181 During his 
introduction of the bill, Senator Hatch acknowledged the need to 
legislate, noting the negative consequences of either outcome of 
Microsoft.182 Specifically, he stated that “[n]o matter how the Court 
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2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/datalaw/wp-content/uploads/sites/149/2018/02/Tech-
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V5F2] [hereinafter Company Letter of Support]. 
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Problem of Cross-Border Data Requests, (Feb. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Press Release, Orrin Hatch], 
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rules . . . problems will remain. Either law enforcement will lack the 
ability to obtain in a timely manner email and documents in the cloud 
that are stored overseas, or providers will find themselves caught 
between conflicting domestic and foreign laws.”183 Congress passed 
the CLOUD Act on March 23, 2018.184 Although not without some 
concerns, the CLOUD Act improves upon the status quo—an outdated 
statute that does not clearly address the Microsoft issue and would lead 
to one of two negative outcomes.185 
The CLOUD Act has two main parts.186 The first part addresses 
the Microsoft issue head on, stating that a provider must comply with 
SCA warrants if the information sought is “within such provider’s 
possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such 
communication, record, or other information is located within or 
outside of the United States.”187 This provision makes it the default for 
a provider to comply with government requests for data stored abroad. 
There is an exception to the default, which is for a provider to file a 
motion to quash or modify if, in a particular instance, the provider 
reasonably believes the target of the government request is a customer 
or subscriber who “is not a United States person and does not reside in 
the United States” and, secondly, “that the required disclosure would 
cause the provider to violate the laws of a qualifying foreign 
government,” which is a government with which the United States has 
an executive agreement.188 The government is given an opportunity to 
respond and the court may modify or quash if it finds the disclosure 
would violate the foreign country’s law, if the target is not a US citizen 
or resident, and if it would be in the interests of justice.189 The last 
factor requires the court to conduct a comity analysis, which may be 
helpful guidance for a court, but it may also be more of a “symbolic 
gesture” of good will towards other countries.190 
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The second main part of the CLOUD Act lifts the blocking 
provisions of the SCA, meaning that ISPs are permitted to comply with 
certain foreign government requests for data if an executive agreement 
between the United States and that country exists.191 Under the current 
SCA, foreign governments cannot directly request data from US-based 
providers, but must instead go through diplomatic channels, 
“enlist[ing] the help of the US Department of Justice to compel the US 
providers to turn over evidence even if the crime being investigated is 
wholly domestic.”192 The bill then lays out the procedures for creating 
executive agreements while also answering the question of how a 
foreign country can become a “qualifying foreign government,” which 
is a required condition for a provider to object to disclosing 
information, by filing a motion to quash or modify under the first part 
of the bill.193 To become a qualifying foreign government, a foreign 
country must adhere to certain international human rights standards and 
have sufficient substantive and procedural protections for accessing 
data, including minimization procedures for the “dissemination of 
information concerning U.S. persons.”194 Additionally, the foreign 
government is prohibited from intentionally targeting a US person or a 
person located in the United States either directly or indirectly.195 Once 
the US Attorney General makes a determination about whether to enter 
into an executive agreement with a country, that decision is not subject 
to any kind of judicial or administrative review.196 
Microsoft and other technology companies have endorsed the 
CLOUD Act because they believe it balances differing interests of law 
 
through whether to issue an order with extraterritorial impact. Its presence in the statute is 
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enforcement, customer privacy, and “gives the technology sector two 
distinct statutory rights to protect consumers and resolve conflicts of 
law,” which include “mechanisms to notify foreign governments when 
a legal request implicates their residents, and to initiate a direct legal 
challenge when necessary.”197 
Opponents of the CLOUD Act, largely consisting of privacy and 
human rights organizations,198 are primarily concerned about the 
effects of diminished privacy and the potential for abuse.199 Camille 
Fischer, a former Obama administration policy advisor and current 
Electronic Frontier Foundation fellow, was concerned about the fact 
that “the bill would allow the President to enter into ‘executive 
agreements’ with foreign governments that would allow each 
government to acquire users’ data stored in the other country, without 
following each other’s privacy laws.”200 These concerns are for the 
privacy interests of people the bill does not explicitly protect—people 
who are not US persons or persons located in the United States.201 A 
government win in Microsoft would have afforded zero protection to 
any person, regardless of nationality, because the interpretation would 
have centered around the custody and control of the sought-after 
data.202 At least with the CLOUD Act, U.S. citizens are afforded a 
stronger guarantee of privacy than could previously have been the case.  
 
197. Company Letter of Support, supra note 181.  
198. Neema Singh Guliani, The Cloud Act Is a Dangerous Piece of Legislation, ACLU 
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/print/node/67581 [https://perma.cc/9RYE-5ZSC]. 
199. See Camille Fischer, The CLOUD Act: A Dangerous Expansion of Police Snooping 
on Cross-Border Data, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2018/02/cloud-act-dangerous-expansion-police-snooping-cross-border-data 
[https://perma.cc/P64V-83NH]; Derek B. Johnson, New CLOUD Act splits industry, civil liberty 
orgs, FCW (Feb. 9, 2018), https://fcw.com/articles/2018/02/09/cloud-act.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/SD54-K66N]. 
200. Fischer, supra note 199. 
201. Id. See Johnson, supra note 199 (“The Center for Democracy and Technology, a think 
tank focused on Internet freedom issues, also has come out against the legislation, arguing the 
new version would allow the Department of Justice to authorize foreign governments to demand 
wiretaps on U.S. companies absent a warrant.”); Grigsby, supra note 192 (“Although the bill 
ostensibly aims to help foreign countries obtain data to investigate local crimes, it could also 
make it easier for them to collect data from U.S. providers for intelligence purposes on targets 
anywhere in the world.”). 
202. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, 31, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 
(2017) (No. 17-2). 
2018] EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF US ACCESS TO DATA 213 
Opponents also find that the bill does not afford sufficient Fourth 
Amendment protections.203 Specifically, the language in the statute is 
too vague, as it “provides only factors, not requirements, for approval 
and is written so broadly as to be open to interpretation.”204 Because 
the standard is worded somewhat ambiguously, this gives the U.S. 
government more discretion in its decisions and will likely result in less 
transparency or accountability, especially considering the lack of 
judicial review.205 The concerns about transparency are well founded 
and Congress should consider amending the CLOUD Act. 
The ACLU also calls the bill a threat to “global activists.”206 They 
state that, under the current standard, activists’ information abroad is 
“protected from being disclosed by U.S. companies to governments 
who may seek to do them harm.”207 However, the CLOUD Act would 
“eliminate[] many of these protections and replace[] them with vague 
assurances, weak standards, and largely unenforceable restrictions.”208 
Although the Attorney General must consider the enumerated factors, 
“he is not prohibited from entering into an agreement with a country 
that has committed human rights abuses.”209 Even Daskal, a proponent 
of the CLOUD Act, agrees that the executive agreement approval 
process could be strengthened and also made transparent, and possibly 
subject to some third party oversight.210 
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The CLOUD Act was rightfully enacted before the Supreme 
Court ruled on the matter. Congress was correct to adopt this legislation 
because it addresses the contested issue in Microsoft and appears to 
adequately balance the competing interests involved. The unamended 
version of the SCA was wholly insufficient to deal with the 
technological realities of today. However, certain parts of the CLOUD 
Act should be modified. The CLOUD Act should be subject to four 
main changes. 
First, transparency should be required in creating executive 
agreements with regard to the CLOUD Act. Currently, the executive 
agreements within the CLOUD Act are “not [] subject to judicial or 
administrative review,”211 but Congress can still check the executive. 
The Attorney General must notify Congress within seven days of 
certifying an executive agreement.212 Then, the agreement enters into 
force no earlier than 180 days after notice, unless Congress enacts a 
joint resolution of disapproval.213 Such a check on the executive 
agreement only appears to rest with Congress as there is no provision 
requiring the exact terms of the agreement to be disclosed. One 
commentator of the CLOUD Act, Greg Nojeim, pointed out concerns 
about such lack of transparency because the Justice Department has not 
disclosed the contents of a draft agreement with the United Kingdom 
made before the CLOUD Act, nor has it disclosed which countries have 
approached the United States about entering into such agreements.214 
Although the government’s actions in these examples may be 
predictive, they are not determinative of what the government will 
actually do when a final agreement is reached. These concerns focus 
on the negotiating stages of such executive agreements. However, until 
the first CLOUD Act executive agreement is reached, the government’s 
position on the transparency of the details of the agreement is 
speculative. 
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Transparency acts as a check on the executive branch, ensuring 
that its decisions are thoroughly and thoughtfully considered.215 
Similar to how courts issue opinions, a determination about an 
executive agreement can be reported and explained.216 This way, 
decisions are subject to public and media scrutiny. Additionally, if an 
applicant country is denied, that country is given an explanation and, if 
it so desires, may make certain changes to be in compliance for a 
subsequent application. Transparency will also ensure that decisions 
are not based on unrelated political factors, such as an historically good 
or bad relationship with a certain country or political retaliation or 
advantage, among other reasons. Determinations about executive 
agreements should focus on the factors listed in the CLOUD Act and 
avoid being overly influenced by politics. 
If the executive branch enters into an agreement with a country 
that commits human rights abuses, there should be some recourse for 
targets of CLOUD Act warrants or disclosure requests by foreign 
nations.217 Executive agreements that are publicly available may also 
be used by targets of a CLOUD Act warrant or disclosure request by a 
foreign nation to challenge whether there is an applicable executive 
agreement. Such valid challenges could not effectively take place 
without knowing the contents of the applicable executive agreement, if 
one exists. 
Secondly, under the current CLOUD Act, providers are not 
required to disclose the existence of legal process to a foreign 
government.218 Specifically, providers are not in violation of the Act if 
they “disclose to the entity within a qualifying foreign government . . . 
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the fact of the existence of legal process.”219 Instead of giving providers 
the discretion of whether or not to disclose, the Act should instead 
require such disclosure to an appropriate authority of every 
government, qualifying or non-qualifying. An appropriate authority 
would likely be the equivalent of the US Department of Justice. This 
aids in transparency and provides more trust between the United States 
and other governments. Additionally, such a requirement would 
necessarily come with a punishment for providers that do not disclose. 
Since the purpose is not to punish providers, but rather to ensure 
transparency, such a punishment could consist of a fine. 
Third, there should be an additional section updating the MLAT 
process for non-qualifying countries. If no executive agreement exists, 
then such countries are left with the old MLAT process that remains 
slow and not universal.220 As the CLOUD Act currently stands, it 
appears to disregard the preferred policies of other countries solely 
based on whether or not an executive agreement with the United States 
exists.221 The qualifying/non-qualifying distinction should remain, but 
there should still be some sort of recourse for countries without an 
executive agreement that have a valid interest and objection to the legal 
process. Thus, although a provider is not required to file a motion to 
quash or modify, the provider would be required to notify both 
qualifying and non-qualifying foreign governments of the legal 
process, under the second proposed change. With that notification, the 
non-qualifying country itself could file an objection or a motion to 
suspend until the MLAT process has been fully carried out. 
Finally, the CLOUD Act currently only allows a court to modify 
or quash legal process if it finds that three conditions are fully met.222 
The first condition is that the “required disclosure would cause the 
provider to violate the laws of a qualifying foreign government.”223 The 
second condition allows modification if, “based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the interests of justice dictate that legal process should 
be modified or quashed” after conducting the comity analysis.224 The 
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third and final condition is that “the customer or subscriber is not a 
United States person and does not reside in the United States.”225 
Considering the second and third recommended modifications 
regarding notification to all countries and allowing non-qualifying 
countries to make an objection, the conditions about when a court may 
modify or quash legal process should also be adjusted. The second and 
third conditions for quashing legal process may be left the same. 
However, the problem with the first condition is that, at least initially, 
not many countries will have an executive agreement with the United 
States, and, thus, it would be impossible to modify or quash any legal 
process if that non-qualifying country is involved. Another issue with 
this condition is that a legal process may not necessarily violate the 
laws of another country, but it could cause outrage that may incite that 
country’s government to retaliate with data localization laws. 
Preventing data localization is in the interest of both law enforcement 
and a provider and should consequently be of the utmost importance.  
Instead of being a required condition, the first factor that the 
“required disclosure would cause the provider to violate the laws of a 
qualifying foreign government” should be an optional finding.226 Also, 
an additional optional finding should be that a non-qualifying country 
has submitted a valid MLAT request (under a revised MLAT system), 
and in that case, the court may also suspend the order temporarily, 
pending the completion of the revised MLAT process. Such a reading 
would give a judge more discretion in deciding such motions, also 
helping to balance the executive branch’s power to enter into executive 
agreements and thereby dictate which countries are “qualifying” as 
well as to respect other countries’ rules of law.227 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prior to the enactment of the CLOUD Act, the SCA was incapable 
of adequately addressing all of the competing interests that were at play 
in Microsoft. The CLOUD Act is a solution that takes into account the 
technological reality of today that is increasingly transcending physical 
borders. It is a legislative attempt to appease law enforcement, 
providers, users, and foreign nations. For now, it provides a solid 
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foundation, and with certain modifications, it could be a promising 
solution. 
 
